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In any case, most theorists imagine that there is in principle a sharp conflict between private rights to property and considerations of social
welfare. The perception of that conflict leads the left wing to reject or restrict private property and the right wing to reject or restrict the welfare
state.
Opposition to that "confict view" has been hampered by a vague, even
empty, invocation of the so-called social character of property. The suggestion is that if private property is essentially "social," there may not be a
serious conflict between property and welfare after all. This is obviously
an important line of inquiry, but everything depends on having a clear
concept of the social character of property.
That clarity has been hard to find. Some say, for example, that property
rights are empty unless they are enforced through some social order.
Since any "real" property right is therefore a socially enforced one, and
since no social order is likely to enforce a right that runs counter to social
welfare, enforcement will carry with it many social-welfare
considerations. "Real" property rights, then, are social in this clear sense.
The problem with this account is that it is too weak. It is accepted by
virtually everyone and therefore cannot help to resolve the current
controversy. To say that "real" rights are enforced is not to say anything
significant about which ones ought to be enforced. And disputes about
that are precisely what the concept of the social character of property is
supposed to help decide.
It will not do, moreover, to patch up the account by pointing out that, as
a matter of fact, certain specific sorts of restrictions (tax liability, eminent
domain, and so forth) have always been imposed on property by political
orders and that we can therefore clearly characterize the role welfare considerations will play in the administration of property rights. That patch-up
continues to beg the question of whether welfare should play such a prominent role. We have recently been invited, after all, to think of rights as
trumps—as cards that take any trick constructed from considerations of
prudence, or efficiency, or expedience, or social welfare.8 The fact that no
one actually does think of them quite that way—in the sense of actually
acting as if the Two of Rights should trump the Ace of Negative Social
Consequences—is not the point. Perhaps we should think so. Perhaps we
should treat rights as trumps. If so, property has precious little "social"
character.
Heroic metaphysical measures fare no better. The social character of
property is not made clear by doctrines about rights emanating from the
collective social body, or about property being held in trust for God. The
former line in unacceptably vague. The latter rests on a religious faith that
is inaccessible to many of us.

Property Rights and Social Welfare
A better way to understand the social character of property is to pay
close attention to the social welfare provisos attached to all of the plausible
justifications for property rights. Such attention will reveal that the conflict
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between private property and social welfare is not as severe (in theory) as
is usually supposed.
. .
The core of my argument for that contention is in this section, and it
has three parts. The first defends the thesis that rights dominate, but do
not trump, other sorts of moral considerations-including social welfare
considerations. The second summarizes arguments (made elsewhere)
that hold that all plausible accounts of justice in property acquisition are
sensitive to social-welfare. The third argues that such sensitivity, in the
form of social welfare provisos, is a permanent feature of individual rights
to property. It is a feature that makes titles self-adjusting with respect to
welfare. Concluding sections of the paper sharpen the general line of argument by replying to some objections and by discussing some connections
to property law.

Rights Are Dominant, But Not Trumps
If individual rights never trump desires, or expedience, or considerations of social welfare, then there are no rights at all in the usual sense.
Rights theorists are correct about that as a purely descriptive matter.
Some sort of preemptive or dominant status is built into the ordinary conception of a right. It may not be possible to justify the inclusion of moral
claims of that sort (i.e., rights) in a coherent moral theory, but that is a
separate question.9 My point here is merely that if there are rights, they
are something like trumps, at least some of the time.
On the other hand, if rights were always trumps, it is hard to imagine
that anyone would want to stay in the game. Surely it is irrational to hold
that a trivial right should block the satisfaction of compelling social
interests. (An argument for that assertion follows.)
The proper analogy (if we must stick to cards) is not that of a trump
suit, but rather what might be called a dominant suit. Imagine a game in
which spades outranks other suits in the following way: Any spade of a
given number (say, a 10) outranks any other card of that number, but not
any higher card. Rights are similar. They are by definition dominant over
considerations of social welfare, efficiency, and prudence, but their dominance is limited by the strength of those other considerations. Compelling
social interests outrank trivial individual rights.
This much is just common sense. It reflects the way we actually use the
concept of a right, and that use (rather than the rights-as-trumps idea)
seems straightforwardly justifiable, (a) After all, once it is granted that
some rights are of relatively minor moral importance, it follows directly
that they are outranked by things of major moral importance, (b) It is undeniable that some human needs (falling short of rights) are of major
moral importance, (c) So it also follows that rights can in principle be outranked by other sorts of moral considerations. No doubt I have a right to
the exclusive use of my private telephone. But the need of my neighbor
for life-saving emergency medical care outranks that right. An operator,
for example, may justifiably interrupt my conversation to put through an
emergency call. That much is clear. What is not so clear is what this does
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to the concept of a right. There are, after all, at least two importantly HT
ferent ways of thinking about this outranking business.
Overridingness.
One way is to insist that rights can sometimes justifiably be override!?
(as in the emergency medical-care case), but that whenever we do that
no matter how good our reasons, we owe the right-holder some sort nf
compensation. If it is a trivial right we've overridden (such as my right tn
an uninterrupted phone call), no doubt a pro forma apology will suffice If
it is a significant right we've overridden, proportionately more is reauini
4
ea
by way of compensation.
This view is uncomfortable because it places a great constraint on the
promotion of social welfare. If compensation is always required even
when individual rights are justifiably overridden, we will often be'in the
position of not being able to afford to do what is justifiable. That is we will
be in a position where social-welfare considerations (exclusive of the cost
oi paying compensation) mandate overriding the right, but the cost of
compensation is prohibitive. And that seems unacceptably paradoxical
Prima Facie Rights.
Another way of looking at the outranking business is to hold that rights
are presumptively dominant, but that the presumption is a rebuttable one
The strength of the rebuttal required depends on the strength of the right'
but once an adequate rebuttal has been made, there is no question of overriding a right and having to make compensation. There is no question of
that because there is no right; the "prima facie" right has evaporated
1 his view is also difficult to accept. The whole notion of a right seems to
have been abandoned here in favor of a case-by-case assessment of what
ought to be done. The notion of a prima facie right comes to little more
than a procedural device for deciding who has the burden of proof. That is
™ g > .?P eciall .y i n t h e contexts of adjudication and ultimate
justification 10 but it is not much like what we ordinarily want to claim for
the status of rights.
Limited Rights.
I shall take a somewhat different approach here. The theory of rights
behind it is the first of the two above: that rights are dominant, but not
trumps They can therefore be overridden, but when they are overridden,
no matter how justifiably, compensation is due. The scope of the compenr n n ^ p r f ° b I e m !? r e , d r u c e d t o manageable proportions by the fact that a
concern for social welfare limits property rights from the very outset.

Property Acquisitions and Social- Welfare Provisos
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property: two versions of the labor theory, an argument from utility, and
an argument from political liberty.11 This is enough to give the views presented here a strenuous test—more strenuous, certainly, than assuming
the validity of only one form ofjustification. And nothing is lost by ignore s the miscellany of other putative justifications (e.g., first occupancy,
- personality, property-worthiness). Some of these others are unsound
anyway, and the rest can be reduced to one or another of the four here assumed to be sound. But I shall not go over the arguments for that
conclusion, because it seems clear that anything that might have to be
added to this list of four justifications would only strengthen the argument
to follow. Likewise, I shall not repeat the arguments designed to show the
soundness of the justifications. I shall merely develop one important
result of those arguments: Each of the four justifications contains a socialwelfare proviso that constrains acquisitions.
(1) Utilitarian arguments are very open about it. In utility theory, what
justifies my title to Greenridge is that it is somehow best for us all—best
for aggregate welfare—if I have it. Clearly, if that is the justification for
property, then social welfare is not a mere proviso—not a mere constraint
on acquisitions. It is the whole issue.
(2) Locke's version of the labor theory justifies acquisitions only on the
condition that enough and as good be left for others.12 It is beyond dispute
that the scarcity of resources and the level of competition for them (i.e.,
some social conditions) will in large measure determine whether a given
acquisition can leave as much and as good for others. Changed social conditions can change the range of permissible acquisitions. That is exactly
what is meant by a social-welfare proviso.
(3) Another version of the labor theory holds that laborers are entitled
to property as a deserved reward for their work—but only if the property
rights awarded them aTe a fitting and proportional reward.13 What is fitting
and proportional will depend in part on social conditions (e.g., scarcity). A
little labor that has only minor and inessential benefit for others does not
deserve the whole world as a reward. But what will count as a disproportionate reward will depend in part on how scarce the resources are and
how essential the prize is to the welfare of others. So this too is a social
welfare proviso.
(4) The argument from political liberty holds that any defensible
system of liberty must allow people enough freedom to acquire some
property. But this argument acknowledges immediately that some acquisitions by me may unjustifiably compromise your liberty. Think of my acquiring all the property surrounding yours, refusing you permission to
cross my property, and thereby making you a de facto prisoner. Requiring
me to grant you an easement to cross my property (by balloon?) is a
simple recognition of the fact that no coherent theory of liberty can adopt
a policy of unconditional acquisition. Which conditions will be necessary
will depend in part on human needs, scarcity of essential resources, and
the level of competition for them. In short, the liberty argument for property also contains a social-welfare proviso.
Each of the arguments that support acquisition, then, includes such a
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Rights and Social Welfare
Tt is clear then, that many apparent conflicts between property rights
ind social welfare may not be that at all. They may instead be cases in
Shich limitations inherent in titles have unexpectedly become operative.
A simple-minded illustration will make the point clearer. Suppose three
neoole are alone on a desert island. There are three tracts of land, of equal
cirp fertility access to fresh water, and convenience. Each person claims
' nne as private property. Suppose further that those claims are justified in
all the usual ways. The private property arrangement is best for all m the
cln«> that it promotes peace and productivity. Each person equally
S v e s a tract as a reward for hard work. And the refusal of any two of
the three to grant the other person ownership rights would be an unjustifiable infringement of liberty.
Now notice the provisos. Everything (in this case) is contingent on the
rough equality of distribution. (We could change the case, of course, to
make it depend instead on the special expertise and goodwill of one
• person-yielding, perhaps, a justification for monopoly.) But in the stated
case if there had been only two tracts, or if one or two had been infertile,
the case for private ownership would not have been possible to make in
the same way. (And let us assume for simplicity that it could not be made
at all in any other way.)
,
Now suppose that after some years two of the tracts are rendered
useless The water sources dry up and the land cannot be farmed. 1 he provisos on acquisition then come back into force. The conditions that once
made the private ownership arrangement a justifiable one no longer
- obtain The arrangement no longer promotes peace and productivity, no
longer causes no loss to others, no longer is a fitting and proportional
reward for labor. When the conditions that justify a right no longer obtain,
there is no (justifiable) right.
Theoretical confusion about this is understandable. Social welfare limitations on titles are imposed at the level of general and specific
justification: They are plain when we consider the question of how any
system of property rights at all can be justified, or under what conditions it
is justifiable for someone to have property rights in land, or nonrenewabie
- resources or ideas. We do not ordinarily think about these
I, questions-and consequently about the social-welfare provisos-when we
deal with particular titles. Instead, we think about the history of the title
' and about the consequences of enforcing or violating it. The issue before
• us therefore appears to be one of striking the proper balance between indir
vidual rights on the one side and public or state interests on the other. 1 he
compensation question arises with full force, then, and we are confronted
with a paradoxical conflict between what we ought to do and what we can
- afford to do.
. , ,
u
!
What I am suggesting is that an attempt to recover the social cnarac' ter" of a title-in the form of the social-welfare provisos that run with
it-is always in order when there is an apparent conflict between property
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rights and social welfare. If the conflict is real, as it sometimes surelv •
then we play the dominance game. We compare the strength of the ? ?'
to the strength, of the conflicting considerations. If the right must K *
overridden, we pay compensation. But if the conflict is only an a p n L ?
one-if, that is, the limitations inherent in the title are precisely the sop-1
welfare considerations at issue-then there is no right to be overran j
n
and no compensation to be paid.
i

Objections and Replies
The consideration of a few objections may help to sharpen the point.

'

Rights Are Permanent
Objection.
The point of having rights as part of the moral landscape is lost if thev
are constantly threatened with extinction by changing conditions Rights
are meant to be fixed features of the landscape-bulwarks against the
tides of public opinion, the expediency of the moment, the tyranny of the
majority. No doubt social welfare is a crucial consideration in the initial
distribution of rights. We must be careful about original acquisitions But
a right whose very legitimacy depends on the chance that a set of social
conditions will remain unchanged-a set of conditions whose continuance
depends in part upon the actions of others-is no right at all. Even if we
must occasionally override rights in order to satisfy needs, we must recognize that we have overridden an important sort of moral injunction. And
no matter how good our reasons were, we owe the injured right-holders
some form of compensation. Once we lose that kind of security, we have
lost the whole point of protecting people with rights.
Reply.
Rights are impervious to whole hosts of social changes-namely, the
ones that did not figure in the justification of the right. And their sensitivity to changes in the conditions that did figure in the justification produces \
no fatal loss of security-any more than does the recognition that rights j
may occasionally have to be overridden. The reason that the loss of securi- *
ty is not fatal is partly, of course, that we are likely to profit from it as well
as lose. (Your loss in private welfare is often my gain in social welfare.)
But the conditions under which a right will "vanish" are also explicit in
the justification of the right. We can in principle be aware of them, if we
think clearly. That goes some way toward giving us the security we desire.
And in any case, the situation here is no more threatening, or unusual,
than our standard practice with respect to promises and contracts. They
too are always conditional, and most of the conditions are
implicit-simply "understood" rather than spoken. ("I'll come over to;
help you move the books tomorrow. Count on me at about noon." And
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ma
W
• nderstood of course, is something like, "I'll do this unless I'm in
1S
W*
,^he flu or . . . " ) Is the whole point of promising lost when hese
^ T ' n n d f t i o n s emerge to excuse the promisor from the duty? I think
^ e n W e merely have to be careful about the kind of excusing conditions
shot, vi

^ R n t w h a t about changes in social conditions that are the fault of other
- ^ T a k e the desert-island case again. Three people start with equa
" C e s One is prudent and thrives. The others are impmden -perhaps
" Svfn spiteful-and allow their water holes to dry up. Does the soc alVelfare Proviso come into play to force the prudent one to share with the
others?
Reply.
This objection is just a special case of two closely related general problems in moral philosophy: (1) To what extent is one obligated to save
wrongdoers (or the foolish) from the consequences of their wrongs (or
follies)? (2) To what extent is one obligated to help innocent third
wurties' Suppose (implausibly) that a hard line on these questions can be
fustified, giving the answer that one is under no obligation to save either
the wroAgdoers or innocent victims. (It would be "good" of one to help
perhaps when an infant is abandoned on the doorstep. But it is not
obligatory) Would that damage the general point about provisos running
with titles? Not at all. It would merely show that the provisos do not include the duty to rescue. So the objection is irrelevant. And in tact the
general point about provisos running with titles is reinforced by a consideration of these fault cases. For example, when criminals violate my right
to freedom, may they not be sanctioned in ways that, under other
conditions, would constitute a violation of their rights? To recognize ha
a criminal act can change one's protections is to concede the point that
provisos attached to the rights run with them thereafter.
Objection.
But the point of this objection may be that there are no social-welfare
provisos at all on property acquisition, and therefore no provisos to run
with titles. Suppose it is held, for example, that people are entitled to whatever they can get and keep, no strings attached. Then the thesis about provisos running with titles is irrelevant.
Reply.
Many amazing things can be "held." If that were all it took to defeat my
arguments there would be no point in making them. But the question is
not what can be held; the question is what can be held with good reason.
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Reply.
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entail that property theory is incoherent. At most, it entails that the theory
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is complex. It is incoherent only if its multiple lines of argument are (a)
equally plausible and (b) inconsistent. Second, we have some reason to
believe that the arguments are consistent. The social-welfare provisos
inherent in the various types of justification for property are strikingly
similar. The "no-loss" requirement imposed by the traditional version of
the labor theory has obvious similarities to the substance, if not the form,
of the limitations imposed by the utility argument, the political liberty
argument, and the proportionality requirement on the reward-for-labor
argument. So even if the various lines of argument are equally sound, we
should be able to coordinate them so as to avoid major conflicts. No doubt
there are striking differences in the various lines of argument. But while
we wait for a resolution to the coordination problem, perhaps we shall not
go too far wrong if we simply adopt, for whole classes of cases, secondlevel principles about which of the provisos applies when.
For example, there are surely cases in which some of the standard justifications for property do not apply. With respect to inheritance, for
instance, the labor theory has only limited application. The heirs have not
earned the property or produced it. And the question of whether laborers
morally acquire the right to control their property in perpetuity is certainly
an open one. So all that may be left here is utility (and perhaps the political
liberty argument, although that is doubtful). In such a case, recovering the
social-welfare proviso would not be so difficult. And of course if one of
these lines of argument emerges as the dominant one, the problem of finding the proviso is further simplified.
Objection.
Yes, but then this whole business begins to look vulnerable to special
pleading. Won't people simply tend to reach for whichever provisos best
suit their purposes? Threatened owners will pick the least restrictive ones;
the state (or other challengers) will pick the most restrictive ones. How
will those disputes be handled?
Reply.
If the process of adjudication is genuinely dialectical—if, that is, in
genuinely problematic cases it is not rigged in advance in favor of one sort
of outcome—then I see nothing wrong with this. And there is surely nothing unusual about it in our legal system. In fact, an adversarial system like
ours is designed to handle such disputes.

Fairness
Objection.
But surely there is a question of fairness here that has been overlooked.
No matter how true it may be that these provisos are inherent in rational
justifications for property, people do not normally think of them—or at
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least not all of them—when they acquire property. Surely one's actual
expectations, one's reasonable expectations given current social and legal
practices, should count for something. Surely those expectations should
control the process of reaching back to pluck the provisos out of some abstract theory or set of theories.
Reply.
When judges decide in negligence cases what counts as an appropriate
standard of care, they apply the so-called reasonability standard. The question is not, "What did the defendant believe was the proper standard?"
but rather, "What would reasonable people believe?" Reasonability is
related to the actual beliefs of the populace as a whole, but it is not completely determined by those beliefs, and it is certainly not determined by
the actual beliefs of the parties to -the case. The situation here is
analogous. Fairness requires that actual expectations be considered, but it
does not require that these be determinative. After all, the expectations of
the parties to a particular case may be bizarre, both with regard to what is
generally believed and what sound theory can support. We cannot be hostage to unfounded opinions in property law any more than we can be hostage to them in criminal law.
The difficult question of fairness arises when theory conflicts with
widely held long-standing beliefs. There we may have to move carefully.
(Though I am uncomfortable with delay. Think of all the specious arguments for gradualism on civil-rights issues.) Property just is "social" in
the sense that I have described. To the extent that we have, through the
legal system or in other ways, collectively encouraged ourselves to think
otherwise, we may (arguably) have to pay the price' in genuine conflicts
between rights and social welfare. But otherwise, we need not pay that
price.

Provisos and Property Law
It is worth noting that property law for centuries has dealt with
provisos that run with titles. The legal materials show a tendency to frame
the issue in terms of a conflict between rights and social welfare—the
same tendency that infects social and political philosophy. But the
prevalence of the problem and the way courts have typically handled it
should be enough to assure skeptical readers that my arguments are not at
some lunatic fringe of empty theorizing. Changes in social conditions do
sometimes change the law's estimate of one's property rights—in ways
that exemplify exactly what I have called the emergence of latent socialwelfare provisos. Two examples from land-use law should suffice to make
the point.

Private Law
The first example concerns restrictive covenants, adopted by individual
landowners and intended by them to run with title to the land even when
they no longer own it.18 Some such covenants (e.g., racially discriminatory
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ones) are unconstitutional.19 But many types of restrictive covenants are
nuite legal and quite common-for example, those restricting land use to
residential purposes* or defining obligations to a property-owners
association.2' Such covenants, if properly drafted, can in principle be enforced by the law in perpetuity.22
.
The important point for present purposes is that courts may terminate
such covenants, against the wishes of one or more of the interested
parties, if another interested party petitions for the termination and
"conditions" have changed sufficiently. The Downs v. Kroeger case23
shows this as clearly as anyone could want to see it. In that case a private
covenant restricting a piece of land to residential use was defeated by a
showing (by owners not party to the original covenant) that the surrounding area had become a business area, greatly increasing the value of the restricted land as a business property and greatly decreasing its value as a
residential property. The petitioners argued that changed conditions made
the purpose of the original covenant impossible to achieve (with respect
to their property), and that while enforcing the covenant would not benefit
anyone significantly, it would impose a serious hardship on them, lhe
court agreed, and even the vigorous dissent conceded the general
principle 24 Unless that decision and others like it are to be construed as
cynical abuses of the rule against ex post facto legislation, they must be
construed as attempts to determine whether social-welfare provisos
implicit in the original covenant, and running with the title, have come
into force through changed conditions.

Public Law
The other example concerns takings law. In this country, all titles to
land are acquired under the condition that the land may be taken, with
due process, for public purposes as long as just compensation is paKL25
That condition expresses my position with regard to rights generally: that
they dominate but do not trump other considerations, and that compensation is due when rights are overridden, no matter how good the reasons
were for overriding them.
.
But there is another equally important constitutional restriction on
titles The government may regulate land use in ways that fall short of
actual takings without paying compensation. (Translation: without, by its
own reckoning, violating ownership rights.) And these regulations may
change over time in ways unanticipated by, and Unfortunate for, the
owners 26 The idea here is clearly comparable to my thesis about latent
provisos. It is true that courts have often spoken as though the issue were
simply one of degree; that is, that most regulations (e.g., taxes, zoning)
do not rise to the level of a taking and therefore do not demand
compensation.27 But why not? Are we to say that the law may violate a citizen's property rights without compensation as long as the rights are
"minor?" Or are we to say instead that a citizen's rights are always sensitive to changes in social conditions-sensitive in the sense that changed
conditions can redefine the scope and character of those rights.' lhe
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former alternative is an uncomfortable one for a legal system that takes
rights seriously^ The latter alternative fits our system much better and?tn
is certainly the better choice.
'
A recent case clearly illustrates the importance of this theoretical issue
The case is Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan Cable CATV Corp. et a!» h
concerns a New York statute that prohibits landlords from interfering
with the installation of cable television facilities on their property and it
gives the State Commission on Cable Television the power to set a
standard, nominal compensatory fee for such installations. The Supreme
Court ruled that such mandatory installations constituted takings The
lines of argument in the majority opinion and in the dissent are instructive
Briefly: Courts have repeatedly held that "Where is no set formula to
determine where regulation ends and taking begins."30 But in the Loretto
case the Court, citing recent precedents as well as legal history,^ denied
that the issue is to be determined solely by balancing public benefits
against private harms. Instead, it affirmed what it took to be the traditional
rule that any permanent physical occupation of property, authorized by
the
government, is a taking for which compensation must be made no
matter how minor the damage to the owner or how great the public
benefit. (See p. 6 of the Slip Opinion.) The Court thus asserts in effect
tnat
rights dominate other considerations, but it fails to consider any
social-welfare provisos that might be relevant to this case. Without a
recognition of such provisos (whether or not they change the result in this
case), the Court's strong stand on the dominance of rights could lead to
some rather dangerous results, as noted by Justice Blackmun in his
dissent. Blackmun's opposition, however, relies on a "balancing of interests" doctrine in which it is all too clear that rights turn out to be little
more tnan
procedural devices for assigning the burden of proof. The resultant conflict of jurisprudent theories is unnecessarily difficult to
resolve. Those who want a robust theory of rights will reject the balancing
test a n d
assume that any dangerous consequences that might follow are
just necessary evils. Those who accept the balancing test (in order to get
the consequences they think are correct case by case) will assume that it is
a watered-down theory of rights that is the necessary evil. My thesis is that
we can have a robust theory of rights and also weigh the consequences
case b
y case-by recognizing the provisos inherent in titles.
I n fact
> l suspect that the practice that I recommend here is already in
lace e v e n if t h e
P
'
Proper theoretical foundation for it is not. But like all
practice based on bad theory, current property-rights practice is vulnerable
to unnecessary confusion, conflict, and error. Recognizing that the theoretlcaI
conflict between rights and welfare is not nearly as severe as it often
s e e m s Wl11 n o t m a k e
,
the practical problems disappear. But it should make
them more tractable.
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Notes
1. An earlier version of this paper was presented to the Jurisprudence Section of the Association of American Law Schools, at their annual meetings in January, 1982.
2. See Roger Pilon, "Ordering Rights Consistently," Georgia Law Review 13 (1979): 1171.
3. See Joseph L. Sax, "Takings, Private Property and Public Rights," Yale Law Journal?,!
(1971): 149. See also William Blackstone, ed., Philosophy and Environmental Crisis (Athens:
University of Georgia Press, 1974).
4 Consider the implications of Nozick's discussion of the Lockean proviso. Anarchy,
State and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1975), pp. 178-82.
5. C. B. Macpherson, "Human Rights as Property Rights," Dissent24 (1977): 72-77.
6. See Bruce Ackerman, Private Property and the Constitution (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1977).
7. See the articles on takings law in Bruce Ackerman, ed., Economic Foundations of Property Law (Boston: Little, Brown, 1975).
8. The metaphor is Ronald Dworkin's, in his Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1977), p. xi.
9. For a sustained argument against the significance of rights as a moral category, see Raymond Frey, Rights and Interests (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980).
10. In adjudication, with its demands on resources and time, burden-of-proof questions
are often crucial. A system of criminal law in which individuals, pitted against the state in an
adversarial system, had the primary burden of proof would be grossly unfair. Likewise,
when the question at issue is an "ultimate" one (e.g., whether we can know anything at all),
deciding who has the burden of proof is often tantamount to deciding which "side" will win.
11. See my Property Rights: Philosophic Foundations (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul,
1977).
12. John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, Second Treatise, chap. V.
13. For a developed presentation of the desert argument, see Property Rights, pp. 48-56.
14. With the exception of the condition, attached only to original acquisition, that the
object acquired be unowned.
15. Anarchy, Stateand Utopia, pp. 178-82.
16. I assume that nihilism is not a moral theory but rather the rejection of moral theory,
and of reason as applied to moral problems.
17. Specifically, chaps. 3-7.
18. A. James Casner and W. Barton Leach, eds., Cases and Text on Property, 2d ed.
(Boston: Little, Brown, 1969), chap. 32.
19. Ibid., pp. 986-1023.
20. See Downs v. Kroeger. 200 Cal. 743, 254 P. 1101 (1927). and cases cited therein.
Compare Redfern Lawns Civic Assn. v. Ciinie Pontitw Co.. 328 Mich. 463, 44 N.W. 2d 8
(1950).
21. See Neponsit Property Owners' Assn., Inc. v. Emigrant Industrial Savings Bank. 278
N.Y. 248, 115 N.E. 2d 793 (1938).
22. Casner and Leach, p. 993, n. 3.
23. 200 Cal. 743, 254 P. 1101(1927).
24. Ibid. Three of the seven justices dissented vigorously—not on the ground that
changed conditions could not terminate covenants, but on the ground that in this case the
changes were not of the sort that could justify termination.
25. The Constitution of the United States, Amendment V: " N o person shall be . . .
deprived o f . . . property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for
public use without just compensation." This is applicable io the states through Amendment
XIV. See Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. v. Nebraska. 164 U.S. 403 (1896).
26. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926), zoning for industrial
purposes; Herman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954), zoning to develop a better balanced, more
attractive neighborhood.
27. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413-416 (1922). For analysis of takings
law generally, see Joseph L. Sax, "Takings and the Police Power," Yale Law Journal 74
(1964): 36; Frank I. Michelman, "Property, Utility and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical
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Foundations of 'Just Compensation' Law," Harvard Law Review 80 (1968): 1165; and
Joseph L. Sax, "Takings, Private Property and Public Rights," Yale Law Journal 81 (1971).
149. In his 1971 article, Sax analyzes takings problems in terms of a conflict between private
rights to property and certain "public" rights. While this is arguably an improvement on a
straight private-right vs. social-welfare analysis, it leads to unnecessarily frequent conflict of
rights situations. My analysis does not.
28. See the discussion of fairness in Michelman, "Property, Utility and Fairness," n. 22
and the general line of argument in Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, chap. 7.
29. U.S. (30, June 1982) No. 81-244.
30. Goldblattv. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, at 594 (1962).
31. E.g., Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
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